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In a model where two competing downstream firms establish an input joint venture (JV), we 
analyze how different royalty rules for covering fixed costs affect channel profits. Under run-
ning royalties (regardless of whether based on predicted or actual output), the downstream 
firms’ perceived marginal costs are above the true marginal costs since fixed costs are in-
corporated. We find that tougher competition between the JV partners may actually increase 
channel profit under such a scheme. We also show that running royalties based on predicted 
output are outperformed by royalties based on actual output, but that lump-sum financing of 
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Abstract
In a model where two competing downstream rms establish an input joint
venture (JV), we analyze how di¤erent royalty rules for covering xed costs
a¤ect channel prots. Under running royalties (regardless of whether based
on predicted or actual output), the downstream rms perceived marginal
costs are above the true marginal costs since xed costs are incorporated. We
nd that tougher competition between the JV partners may actually increase
channel prot under such a scheme. We also show that running royalties based
on predicted output are outperformed by royalties based on actual output, but
that lump-sum nancing of the JV is preferable if the competitive pressure is
weak.
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1 Introduction
It is widely observed that competing rms establish upstream joint ventures (JVs).
In high-tech industries, research and development joint ventures are common for e.g.
software, electronic hardware and pharmaceutical products. Within telecommunica-
tions, the European Commission (2009) invites competing operators to create joint
ventures and other forms of cooperative agreements to generate new infrastructure
(such as xed and mobile high-bandwidth networks) and to acquire spectrum rights.
From the authoritiesperspective the gains from allowing competing rms to set up
JVs range from environmental improvements (e.g. co-siting of antennas for mobile
networks), higher investment incentives and less duplication of xed costs to more
rapid rollout of new and better infrastructure. In grocery markets large retail chains
have formed procurement alliances (buyer groups), such that the level of concentra-
tion is higher for procurement than for retailing (see e.g. Clarke et al., 2002, Dobson
and Waterson, 1999 and Foros and Kind, 2008).1
We focus on the allocation of unavoidable xed costs in the JV, i.e. costs which
are not a¤ected by output levels. Examples of such costs are joint investments in new
digital infrastructure and development of digital information goods. Especially for
xed broadband investments, the largest part of the xed cost is literally speaking
sunk, spent on digging ducts (not on ber-optic cables and other electronic equip-
ment). Similarly, for digital information goods the large xed costs are typically
sunk when the rst copy is developed. The same features hold for hardware. Think
of a smartphone. When a new model is launched, the development costs cannot be
regained even if the product becomes a op. Royalty rules for covering xed costs
are by their very nature arbitrary2, and our aim is to analyze how the three most
common rules a¤ect downstream competition.
1For an extensive list of examples of joint ownership in vertical market structures, see e.g. Park
and Ahn (1999).
2As a consequence, we focus on xed cost components ill-suited for cost allocation methods,
such as Activity Based Costing (ABC). Noreen (1991) sets up the necessary requirements for using
ABC. Bromwich and Hong (2000) provide an interesting example of the suitability of ABC when
analyzing whether BTs accounting system satises the conditions for accounting separability.
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As a benchmark we consider lump-sum royalties. Since lump-sum payments are
not based on output, they do not a¤ect the JV members choice of downstream
prices. We compare lump-sum royalties with running royalties, where payments de-
pend on the downstream rmsoutput. We consider two forms of running royalties;
one which depends on predicted output, and one which depends on actual output.
Under a running royalty scheme based on predicted output, the per unit transfer price
is calculated based on expectations of aggregate output. Since the transfer price is
increasing in the size of the xed costs, the perceived downstream marginal costs
are higher than under lump-sum royalties. Sharing rules that incorporate xed costs
into the unit payments from the JV members thus soften downstream competition
and lead to a higher price level than the lump-sum scheme.3
The alternative to predicted outcomes is running royalties based on actual out-
put, where xed costs are distributed based on realized volumes ex-post. This sig-
nicantly changes the rmspricing incentives. The reason is that when running
royalties are based on actual output, a higher output reduces the perceived down-
stream marginal costs. Thus, the rms will have incentives to set relatively low
end-user prices in order to reduce production costs on infra-marginal units.
If the rms are symmetric along all dimensions, we show that even though their
incentives are quite di¤erent under the two running royalty schemes, the equilibrium
outcomes will be identical. This is not so if the rms have di¤erent ownership shares
in the JV. Then running royalties based on actual output generate higher prots
than running royalties based on predicted output. The reason is that the rm with
the larger ownership share will compete more aggressively than its rival under a
predicted output scheme, and this distorts the market.
The question that begs to be asked is whether royalties based on actual output
are widely used. At rst glance it might not seem to be so, since joint venture
agreements often include elements where xed costs are allocated based on pre-
dicted volumes. However, such agreements typically also include a clause to adjust
3If each JV member estimates its own volume, it is obvious that sharing rules which are based
on these estimates may generate opportunistic behavior. We intentionally abstract from such
problems to focus on the interplay between xed costs sharing rules and downstream competition.
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for actual volumes if there are signicant deviations between predicted and actual
volumes. One example is provided by Groot and Merchant (2000) from the auto-
mobile industry, where the JV agreements involve a solidarity principle: If actual
volumes deviate signicantly from expectations, then ex post adjustments are made
where the party "over using" capacity relative to expectations, compensates the
party which is "under using". In the grocery markets di¤erent forms of buy-back
clauses may have the same e¤ect (see e.g. Bloom et al., 2000).4
Since running royalties based on actual volumes weakly dominate schemes based
on predicted volumes, we concentrate on actual volumes when comparing to lump-
sum royalties. To highlight the vices and virtues of the rules, assume rst that
the downstream rms do not compete, such that they are de facto monopolies in
their respective markets. Under a lump-sum royalty scheme the rms face the true
marginal costs, and will therefore set the same prices as a perfect cartel would do.
With running royalties, on the other hand, the perceived marginal costs are above
the real ones. Therefore prices will be ine¢ ciently high compared to what maximizes
channel prots (analogous to Spengler, 1950).
Now, suppose that the rms are rivals in the downstream market. Then prots
under the lump-sum scheme will clearly be lower the better substitutes the con-
sumers perceive the goods to be. The same is not necessarily true with running
royalties. On the contrary, it might well be that prots increase as downstream
competition intensies (products become closer substitutes). The reason for this is
precisely that end-user prices are too high under running royalties if the goods are
poor substitutes. Competition which presses down end-user prices and reduces the
perceived marginal production costs might thus benet the rms - although they
will unambiguously be harmed if competition becomes too tough. Consequently, we
have the seemingly counter-intuitive result that up to a point, more downstream
4Lund et al. (2004) nd an analogous form of adjustment applied to transfer prices by trad-
ing subsidiaries to avoid allegations of tax evation. Transfer prices are in most cases based on
projections, and projections are in many cases inaccurate. Thus the transfer price may fall short
of covering unit costs and tax authorities may suspect attempts of tax evation. To mitigate this,
many rms have started using so called "keep well" agreements which oblige the parties to make
year-end adjustments.
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competition increases prots. A corollary is that prot under running royalties
may be higher when JV members are downstream rivals than when they operate
in independent downstream markets. Managers arguing that they welcome more
competition are usually met with skepticism. However, this may actually be true
if they nance an input joint venture BY running royalties. Correspondingly, our
model predicts that running royalties are more frequently used the more aggressively
the rms compete in the downstream market.
The present paper is related to the literature on how unit royalties may be
used to soften competition among members of an input JV (see e.g. Priest, 1977,
Park and Ahn, 1999, Chen and Ross, 2003, and Motta, 2004). Park and Ahn
(1999) analyze joint ownership upstream combined with a conjectural variations
approach to downstream competition. The wholesale price between upstream and
downstream rms is determined through bargaining where the bargaining power is
based on the rmsownership shares. Park and Ahn show that each rm either
prefers a wholesale price equal to marginal cost or the monopoly price, depending
on its ownership share. Chen and Ross (2003), in contrast, focus on the protability
of a JV compared to a full-scale merger. This is not an issue we focus on, nor on the
related question of whether competing rms should buy from a common supplier.
The latter is analyzed in Arya, Mittendorf, and Sappington (2008). They show how
an integrated rm (with its own upstream input) may choose to buy from the same
supplier as the downstream rival to make the external supplier less eager to o¤er
the input on favorable terms to the downstream rival.
Recent studies have found the use of actual (instead of predicted) volume to have
amiable properties also in regulated industries, specically for regulation of access
prices.5 Fjell, Foros, and Pal (2010) show that basing average cost access prices
on actual rather than predicted volumes, neutralizes the articial cost advantage
enjoyed by a vertically integrated incumbent and hence creates a truly, level playing
eld in the downstream market. See also Bo¤a and Panzar (2012).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the model
5The majority of access price regulation rules within telecommunications used worldwide are
based on an averaging of xed costs (Vogelsang, 2003).
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and compare pricing incentives under lump-sum royalties and running royalties.
Then, in section 3, we put more structure to the model (consider a quadratic utility
function) to compare prots and prices under the di¤erent schemes. Finally, in
section 4 we provide some concluding remarks.
2 The model
We consider a market structure where two competing downstream rms form an
input joint-venture (JV). Firm i = 1; 2 owns a share si 2 [0; 1] of the JV. We assume
that ownership shares are exogenous, and that s1 + s2 = 1.
The cost structure of the JV is given by
C = F + cQ; (1)
where F is the xed capacity cost, c  0 is marginal production costs, and Q is
output. It takes one unit of the JV good to produce one unit of the downstream
good, so with obvious notation we have Q = q1 + q2.
The JVs xed costs are covered by the downstream rms, and we compare the
outcomes from the following three payment schemes:
I Lump-sum (LS): Fixed costs covered through lump-sum payments. Since
lump-sum payments do not a¤ect rm behavior per se, it is immaterial how
much of the xed costs are covered by each rm. However, to be specic, we
assume that the lump-sum payment from Firm i equals siF; where   1 is
a markup on the JVs xed costs.
II Running royalties based on predicted output (PO): Firm i pays qibQF ,
where bQ is predicted aggregate output.
III Running royalties based on actual output (AO): Firm i pays qi
Q
F ,
where Q is actual output.
Since our focus is on whether the xed costs should be nanced through lump-
sum payments or running royalties, we assume that there is no mark-up on the
6
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JVs marginal production costs. The downstream rms thus pay c per unit of the
upstream good in addition to the royalties. Thereby we also avoid the trivial solution
that the JV partners achieve the same outcome as in a perfect cartel (or full merger)
by a suitable choice of wholesale price from the JV to the downstream rms (see
Priest, 1977, and Chen and Ross, 2003).
Regardless of which payment scheme is chosen, Firm i receives revenues from
the JV according to its ownership share si: Firm is prot under the three di¤erent
schemes is consequently given by:
LSi = (pi   rLS) qi   siF ; where rLS = c (2)
POi = (pi   rPO) qi + siF


Q
Q^
  1

; where rPO =
FbQ + c (3)
AOi = (pi   rAO) qi + siF (  1) ; where rAO =
F
Q
+ c (4)
Throughout we assume that the demand function qi(p1; p2) and the prot func-
tion i satisfy the following properties:
@qi
@pi
< 0;
@qi
@pj
> 0;
@qj
@pi
<  @qi
@pi
and
@2i
@pi@pj
 0 i; j = 1; 2, i 6= j;
(5)
Condition (5) implies that the products are imperfect substitutes and that prices
are strategic complements, as dened in Bulow et al. (1985). Throughout, we pre-
suppose that all stability and second-order conditions hold (see e.g. Vives 1999, ch.
6). Furthermore, we assume that the cross-price e¤ects on demand are symmetric,
such that @qj=@pi = @qi=@pj:
We assume the following structure and timing of the game: At stage 1 the
rms cooperatively choose between the LS, PO, and AO schemes to maximize
aggregate channel prots.6 At stage 2 they non-cooperatively decide downstream
prices simultaneously.
In the lump-sum (LS) scheme it follows from (2) that the FOCs at stage 2 are
given by :
6This seems natural, since they do not have any conict of interest in choice of royalty scheme.
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@LSi
@pi
=

qi + (pi   rLS) @qi
@pi

= 0; where rLS = c (6)
Increasing the end-user price has the standard e¤ect of raising the prot margin
and reducing sales. Prot for Firm i is thus maximized by setting pi such that the
sum of the terms in the square bracket of (6) is equal to zero.
Dening "i =   (@qi=@pi) (pi=qi) > 1 as the own-price elasticity on good i; we
can rewrite (6) to arrive at the standard inverse elasticity rule:
pLSi =
1
1  1
"i
c: (7)
Under Running royalties based on predicted output (PO), it follows from
(3) that the FOCs at stage 2 can be written as:
@POi
@pi
=

qi + (pi   rPO) @qi
@pi

| {z }
downstream e¤ect
+ si
F
Q^
@Q
@pi| {z }
ownersh ip e¤ect
( )
= 0; where rPO =
FbQ + c (8)
The term in the square bracket corresponds to the FOC for prot-maximization
under LS, c.f. equation (6). However, since the perceived downstream marginal
costs are greater here than under lump-sum nancing (rPO > rLS); the end-user price
will also be higher. A qualitatively important di¤erence from the LS case, though,
is that the rm will set a lower price than the one which maximizes downstream
prots if si > 0; and more so the higher are si and : Formally, this follows from
the fact that the term outside the square bracket in (8) is negative (since @Q
@pi
< 0),
such that the marginal protability of a price increase is reduced. The intuition for
this is simply that the upstream prot that Firm i makes from the JV is increasing
in actual output, and therefore decreasing in own price. Since Firm i cares more
about upstream prots the greater its ownership share in the upstream rm, we can
state:
8
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Proposition 1: Assume that running royalties are based on predicted output
(PO). The greater a rms ownership in the joint venture ( si), the lower its price
will be in the end-user market.
Solving equation (8) with respect to pi, we can write Firm i0s equilibrium price
as
pPOi =
1
1  1
"i

c+
F
Q^

1  si

1 +
@qj=@pi
@qi=@pi

: (9)
Since @qj=@pi
@qi=@pi
2 (0; 1), the term in the square bracket of (9) is positive. Compar-
ing with equation (7), we thus see that the end-user price under PO is unambiguously
higher than under LS; but less so the greater the rms ownership share in the JV.
Finally, under Running royalties based on actual output (AO), the stage
2 FOCs follow from (4):
@AOi
@pi
=

qi + (pi   rAO) @qi
@pi

| {z }
downstream e¤ect
+

 @rAO
@pi

qi| {z }
cost e¤ect
( )
= 0; where rAO =
F
Q
+ c (10)
The FOCs under scheme AO (10) are qualitatively di¤erent from the FOCs under
scheme PO (8). Under scheme AO there is no ownership e¤ect on Firm is pric-
ing incentives. The reason for this is that if the running royalties are based on
actual volume, then JV prots are simply determined by the mark-up on the xed
costs given by . In particular, JV prots are independent of output and thus of
downstream prices. In contrast to when royalties are based on predicted volume, a
majority shareholder has the same pricing incentives as a minority owner. A second
qualitative di¤erence from PO is that downstream rms will now have incentives
to set relatively low end-user prices in order to increase output and thus reduce
the perceived downstream marginal costs, as shown by the term outside the square
bracket in (10):
@rAO
@pi
=  F
Q2
@Q
@pi
> 0: (11)
9
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We can state:
Proposition 2: Assume that running royalties are based on actual output. In-
dependent of their ownership share in the joint venture, the rms have incentives to
set relatively low end-user prices in order to reduce downstream marginal production
costs rAO.
We can use equations (10) and (11) to write equilibrium prices as
pAOi =
1
1  1
"i

c+
F
Q

1  qi
Q

1 +
@qj=@pi
@qi=@pi

(12)
Note that the term with the cross-price e¤ect,

1 +
@qj=@pi
@qi=@pi

, is multiplied by Firm
is output share (qi=Q). This share is equal to 1/2 if the rms are symmetric. If
royalties instead are based on predicted output, equation (9) shows that the term is
multiplied by the ownership share in the JV (si). Interestingly, we can thus conclude:
Proposition 3: Assume s1 6= s2. Other things equal, aggregate channel prof-
its are higher if the running royalties are based on actual rather than on predicted
output.
Proposition 3 is true because if the goods enter symmetrically in consumer utility,
then convexity of consumer preferences implies that aggregate prots for any given
output are maximized if the rms charge the same prices, other things equal. The
prices of the two rms will always be the same if running royalties are based on
actual sales, but not if the royalties are based on predicted sales and s1 6= s2: In the
latter case royalties based on predicted sales create a distortion in the market which
hurts the industry.
We assume that joint venture partners are rational when they predict output,
such that qi + qj = Q^: If s1 = s2 we nd that the rst-order conditions under both
PO and AO are equal to
@POi
@pi
=
@AOi
@pi
=

qi +

pi   F
2qi
  c

@qi
@pi

+
1
2
F
qi
@qi
@pi
= 0: (13)
This allows us to state:
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Corollary 1: Assume that the rms are symmetric and have the same ownership
shares in the JV (s1 = s2 = 1=2). Then a running royalty scheme based on predicted
output yields the same prot as one based on actual output.
Even though the rms pricing incentives are quite di¤erent under the two
schemes (taking into account changes in upstream prots under scheme PO and
changes in marginal production costs under scheme AO), the equilibrium outcomes
will thus be the same under perfect symmetry.
To summarize, the actual output scheme (AO) yields higher channel prots than
the predicted output scheme (PO), except for the special case s1 = s2 = 1=2.
So what can be said about the relative performance of the lump-sum scheme?
We can draw quite general conclusions also with regard this question; whether LS
yields higher prots than running royalties depends on the competitive pressure.
This can actually be seen without making any calculations. Suppose rst that the
goods are close substitutes (high cross-price e¤ect). The rms will then necessarily
compete marginal prots down to zero as price approaches marginal cost. In this
case, a payment scheme based on running royalties (AO as well as PO) performs
signicantly better than the lump-sum scheme (LS). This is because perceived
downstream marginal costs are higher under running royalties than under lump-
sum nancing of the JVs xed costs. Thus, running royalties soften competition
and lead to a higher price level than the lump-sum scheme (LS).
On the other hand, if products are poor substitutes (small cross-price e¤ects),
the fact that a running royalty scheme articially raises perceived marginal costs
above real marginal costs causes end-user prices to be too high. In this case, the
lump-sum scheme (LS) maximizes aggregate industry prots.
We can summarize these ndings as follows:
Proposition 4: Financing the JV through running royalties (regardless of whether
based on actual or predicted output) yields higher channel prots than the lump-sum
scheme if downstream competition is su¢ ciently strong. Otherwise, aggregate chan-
nel prots are higher under the lump-sum scheme.
Since the JV members cooperatively choose the royalty rule at stage 1, they
11
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choose the rule that maximizes aggregate channel prots. Thus, the prediction
from above is that, all other things equal, rms choose running royalties (based on
actual output) as long as their products are close substitutes. When the degree
of downstream competition is su¢ ciently low, rms prefer lump-sum royalty to
running royalties. In the next section we illustrate the results above and also gain
some additional insight by using a specic utility function.
3 Lump-sum vs. running royalties: Comparison
of prots and prices
Let us now add more structure to the model by assuming that the consumers have
a quadratic utility function:
U(q1; q2) = v
2X
i=1
qi  
24(1  ) 2X
i=1
q2i +

2
 
2X
i=1
qi
!235 : (14)
The parameter v > 0 in equation (14) is a measure of the market potential and qi is
consumption of good i. The parameter  2 [0; 1) is a measure of how di¤erentiated
the goods are; they are closer substitutes from the consumerspoint of view the
higher is :7
Solving @U=@qi   pi = 0 for i = 1; 2, we nd
qi =
1
2

v   pi
1   +

2 (1  ) (pi + pj)

(15)
Further, from 15 we have that
7Utility function (14) is due to Shubik and Levitan (1980). The advantage of this formulation
is that  is a unique measure of product di¤erentiation. In a standard quadratic utility function,
on the other hand, an increase in  both means that the products become less di¤erentiated and
that the size of the market is reduced. See Motta (2004) for a discussion. Sha¤er (1991) uses
a similar framework to provide a comparative welfare analysis of slotting allowances and RPM.
Deneckere and Davidson (1985) use the Shubik-Levitan utility function when they analyze the
merger incentives of price-setting rms.
12
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Q = v   pi + pj
2
: (16)
Royalty scheme PO
Consider rst the royalty scheme based on predicted output, and dene f  F=Q^:
Inserting (15) into (3) and setting @i=@pi = @j=@pj = 0 we nd8
pPOi =
2 (1  ) (c+ v) + c + f
4  3   2f
1  
4  

si   1
2

(17)
qPOi =
(2  ) (v   c)  f
2 (4  3) +
f
4  

si   1
2

(18)
Consistent with our general results above, equation (17) shows that the price charged
by Firm i is decreasing in its ownership share si in the JV. It thus follows that if
si > sj, then pi < pj and qi > qj: However, aggregate output is independent of the
distribution of the ownership shares; combining (16) and (17) yields
QPO =
(v   c) (2  )  f
4  3 : (19)
Assuming rationality, such that qi + qj = Q^; we can solve f = FQ^ to nd that
f =
(2  ) (v   c) 
q
(2  )2 (v   c)2   4F (4  3)
2
: (20)
Letting PO denote aggregate channel prots, we have
PO =
[(2  ) (v   c)  f] [2 (1  ) (v   c) + f]
(4  3)2  
f 22 (1  ) (1  2s1)2
(4  )2   F:
(21)
Royalty scheme AO
From the general analysis above we know that the outcomes under PO and AO
are identical if si = 1=2: Therefore the expression for f in equation (20) holds in
8It can be shown that @
2i
@p2i
=   12

2 
1 

< 0, that @
2i
@pi@pj
= 14


1 

, and hence that the second
order conditions for a unique maximum are satised by: @
2i
@p2i
@2j
@p2j
 

@2i
@pi@pj
2
= 116

16 16+32
[ 1]2

>
0:
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both cases, and QAO = QPO. By setting si = 1=2 into equations (17) - (21) we can
further immediately see that we have:9
pAOi =
2 (1  ) (c+ v) + c + f
4  3 ; (22)
qAOi =
(2  ) (v   c)  f
2 (4  3) : (23)
and
AO =
((2  ) (v   c)  f) (2 (1  ) (v   c) + f)
(4  3)2   F: (24)
Royalty scheme LS
The equilibrium with lump-sum nancing of the JVs xed costs is most easily
found by setting  = 0 into equations (17) - (21). This yields
pLSi =
2 (1  ) (c+ v) + c
4  3 (25)
qLSi =
(2  ) (v   c)
2 (4  3) (26)
and
LS = 2 (   1) (c  v)2    2
(4  3)2   F: (27)
Comparison of royalty schemes AO and LS
We now concentrate on AO for running royalties since this scheme weakly domi-
nates PO. To highlight the di¤erences between nancing the JV through lump-sum
payments and running royalties, let  = 1 (such that there is no upstream prot):
We then nd
AO   LS = f (v   c)   f
(4  3)2 ? 0:
9This is of course straight-forwardly veried by inserting for (15) into (4) and solving @i=@pi =
0:
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The left-hand side panel of Figure 1 shows AO and LS as functions of the di¤er-
entiation between the goods. Not surprisingly, the curve LS is strictly downward-
sloping. This reects a well-known result; the better substitutes two rms produce;
the more ercly they will compete. At  = 1 the goods are perfect substitutes, and
we will then have the Bertrand paradox where price equals marginal costs (p = c). If
both rms are operative, they will not be able to cover the xed costs (F ). With the
chosen parameter values (see Appendix), we have LS > 0 only if  < c2  0:75:
The curve AO is more striking; but illustrates Proposition 4. The curve is at
rst upward-sloping. Along this segment the rms will consequently make higher
prots the better substitutes they produce. The reason for this surprising result
is that competition presses down end-user prices, and thus increases output. This
means that Q is an increasing function of ; and f is therefore decreasing in : Put
di¤erently, because competition induces the rms to expand output, they will also
face lower (perceived) marginal production costs. This in turn leads to a further
increase in output. Competition thus creates positive externalities between the rivals
which imply that prots increase along the upward-sloping curve. The prot margin
falls, but due to the lower marginal production costs output increases su¢ ciently
to increase joint prots. However, as we approach  = 1; the rms will necessarily
compete total prots down to zero. This is nonetheless signicantly better than
if the rms had planned to nance a possible JV through lump-sum payments;
downstream prots would then be pressed down to zero, making the joint venture
project infeasible:10
10If  > 1 the rms would make super prot (1 > 0) even at s = 1; while they would be unable
to cover the xed at least in the neighborhood of  = 1 if  < 1:
15
SNF Working Paper No 16/13
Figure 1: Prots, prices and substitutability
The articially high marginal costs thus explain why AO > LS if  is su¢ -
ciently high ( > c1). Interestingly, they also explain why AO < LS for lower
values of : This is most easily understood if we consider the limit  = 0: Here each
rm has monopoly power in its own market segment, and prots must then necessar-
ily be highest if the rms set prices based on the true marginal costs (c): However, at
 = 0 output will be particularly low, and the perceived marginal production costs
(r) thus correspondingly high. We consequently see that whether output-based or
lump-sum nancing of the JV is most protable depends critically on how ercly
the rms compete in the end-user market (and on the value of ).
Some further insight into the relationship between end-user prices under running
royalties and downstream substitutability is provided in the right-hand side panel
of Figure 1. The cartel price in our numerical example is pcartel = 5 (the intrinsical
willingness to pay for the goods, and thus the cartel price, is independent of how
close substitutes the goods are): If the goods are poor substitutes, the articiality
high perceived marginal costs imply that end-user prices will be much too high -
they are equal to pAO = 10 for  = 0. As  increases and competition intensies,
the perceived marginal costs and end-user prices fall. At   0:84 we arrive at the
remarkable result that the equilibrium price with competition is equal to the cartel
price. Only if the goods are closer substitutes than this will the rms compete prices
below the level that maximizes aggregate channel prot.
Finally, let us look at the relationship between prots and ownership shares in the
JV when the royalties are based on predicted output. As noted above, asymmetric
16
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ownership creates a distortion in the end-user market that reduces joint prots, and
it is not clear whether the majority or minority share owner will make the higher
prot. For the specic model used in this section we prove the following in the
Appendix:
Proposition 5: Assume that royalties are based on predicted output and that
s1 > 0:5. Firm 1 has lower total prots than Firm 2 if  <   4F(v c)2 and higher
prots if  >  (1 < 2 if  <  and 1 > 2 if  > ):
To see the intuition for Proposition 5, assume rst that   1: The goods are
then almost perfect substitutes such that the cross-price elasticity is very high. Firm
1 will thus capture most of the market and make a higher prot than its rival. It
thus benets from the fact that its high ownership share makes it credible that it
will set a low end-user price.
Suppose next that  = 0: Now there is no competition between the rms, and
the low price charged by Firm 1 is clearly an advantage for Firm 2, because it
increases its output and thus reduces the perceived marginal production costs (r).
In a sense Firm 2 is a free-rider in the downstream market for Firm 1s pursuit of
higher upstream prots.
The result in Proposition 5 is shown by the hump-shaped curves in Figure 2
(see Appendix for parameter values). The maximal di¤erences in prots for the two
rms are more pronounced the higher the xed costs. This is because the larger
is F , the stronger incentives Firm 1 will have to set a relatively low end-user price
to expand output. This explains why the solid curve (where F = 5) in Figure 2 is
atter than the dotted curve (where F = 10):
17
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Figure 2: Asymmetric ownership shares and prots.
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper we analyze a market structure where two downstream competitors
establish an input joint venture, and we show how the choice of royalty rule to cover
xed costs may a¤ect competition downstreams. If the rms compete aggressively,
their aggregate prots are higher under running royalties than under lump-sum
royalties. If running royalties are used, we show that there is a hump-shaped rela-
tionship between the rmsprotability and how ercly they compete.
We do not analyze interactions with rms outside the joint venture. If there is a
third rm in the market (with access to an alternative input source), our conjecture
is that the use of running royalties may lead to a Stackelberg game where the
two JV members commit to using higher (perceived) marginal costs when deciding
on downstream prices. In such a context, the outcome could crucially depend on
whether the JV members can credibly commit to a royalty rule observed by the
third rm.
Another interesting topic is the potential e¤ects of allowing the JV to o¤er
access to the input joint venture to a third party. Even if the third party operates
18
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in an independent downstream market, providing such access will typically a¤ect
the coverage of xed costs. Under running royalties, this would a¤ect downstream
pricing incentives. Interactions with (i) a third party with access to an alternative
input source and/ or (ii) a third party that buys access from the JV are interesting
topics for further research.
5 Appendix
Parameter values
In Figure 1 we have set  = 1; si = 1=2; v = 10; c = 0; and F = 20: In Figure 2
 = 1; s1 = 3=4; v = 10 and c = 0:
Proof of Lemma 1
Inserting for (20) into the rmsprot functions we have
1   2 =  2

s1   1
2

f (1  )N
(4  3) (4  ) ;
where N  2 (1  ) (v   c) 
q
(2  )2 (v   c)2   4F (4  3): It is now straight
forward to show that signN = sign

4F   (v   c)2 : Q.E.D.
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On the Choice of Royalty Rule  
to Cover Fixed Costs in Input  
Joint Ventures
Kenneth Fjell
Øystein Foros
Hans Jarle Kind
In a model where two competing downstream firms establish an input joint venture (JV), we 
analyze how different royalty rules for covering fixed costs affect channel profits. Under run-
ning royalties (regardless of whether based on predicted or actual output), the downstream 
firms’ perceived marginal costs are above the true marginal costs since fixed costs are in-
corporated. We find that tougher competition between the JV partners may actually increase 
channel profit under such a scheme. We also show that running royalties based on predicted 
output are outperformed by royalties based on actual output, but that lump-sum financing of 
the JV is preferable if the competitive pressure is weak.
